Introduction
In intercultural situations, Interlanguage (IL) speakers may switch between their native language (NL) and IL and between various ILs depending on context and a variety of other factors (e.g., Selinker, 1992) . Little discussion has appeared in the literature which addresses the cognitive processes that subserve this behaviour. Evidence from bilingual aphasia and neurolinguistic research can contribute to the way in which the cognitive description of the ability to switch between different language systems in spoken production must be developed in order to contribute to a comprehensive account of IL performance.
The term 'switching' is applied here in its broadest sense.
The notion of code-switching is used to describe the performance of a speaker (or speakers) who shifts between their various languages and ILs in listening and speaking, alternating between codes at the clause, sentence or discourse level or in response to situational or psycholinguistic constraints.
'Code-switching' is commonly employed in the bilingualism literature to describe speakers and situations in which there is mixing or switching between more than one language (e.g. Grosjean, 1982) . Sociolinguists have demonstrated the range of social and situational variables which affect code-switching behaviour and the concomitant linguistic constraints on producing utterances with language mixing (see Nishimura, 1986; GardnerChloros, 1995 and references therein) . Switching and mixing of languages in interlingual situations may be due to variability in TL (target language) competence reflected in re-emergence of production of fossilized forms in certain contexts or discourse domains (Selinker, 1992) .
The origin of the concept of a mechanism for switching between language systems lies in the realm of neurolinguistics.
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The neurologist Wilder Penfield (1959) provided the modern formulation of the idea of a "curiously effective automatic switch that allows each individual to turn from one language to another. What I have referred to as a 'switch' would be called, by experimental physiologists, a conditioned reflex. When child or adult turns to an individual who speaks only English, he speaks only English, and, turning to a man who speaks French and hearing a word of French, the conditioning signal turns the switch over and only French words seem to come to mind." (p. 253)
Penfield makes specific neurolinguistic claims, stating that "the [linguistic] mechanism that is developed in the brain is the same whether one, two or more languages are learned...the cortico-thalamic speech mechanism serves all...languages [known to the speaker] and there is no evidence of anatomical separation..." (1959, p. 253 ).
This neurolinguistic issue has obvious implications for patterns of bilingual aphasia as Penfield himself points out. He states that descriptions in the literature describing bilingual aphasics who lost one language and preserved another as the result of a stroke must have been inadequately studied or be due to psychological (i.e. emotional rather than cognitive) reasons why one language was preferred during recovery. 2 Penfield's shift from a neurological to psychological account for the ability or inability to switch between languages is unsatisfactory. Detailed descriptions of bilingual aphasia have been published throughout this century (see Paradis, 1983 ) and a major monograph on the subject was produced by Albert (Albert and Obler, 1978; Paradis, 1977; 1983) .
The question that is often asked by neurolinguists is: Is the differential or selective recovery sometimes seen in cases of bilingual aphasia an example of an impaired switch mechanism?
New evidence A recently published case of bilingual aphasia (Aglioti and Fabbro, 1993) may be interpreted as evidence of impairment to the 'switch mechanism.' The paper documents a case where L2 Italian, studied formally in school and to a fairly low level of proficiency, was the IL produced spontaneously by the patient in preference to her NL Venetan which was her home language.
3 The patient produced her Italian IL preferentially, even when explicitly asked to speak her NL. She even produced her IL Italian in contexts where she knew that her listeners were monolingual Venetan speakers who could not understand it. In instances where she started off speaking in her NL Venetan she would soon switch back to Italian IL, even in formal examinations where she was explicitly instructed only to speak Venetan. This patient could be described as suffering from an impaired ability to switch to and from one of her two languages and maintain spoken production in a given language. What was significant about her impaired ability to produce language was that her choice of language was often inappropriate to a particular discourse context. She may be said to have lost what
Penfield described as the "conditioned reflex" to switch to and produce the appropriate language for the context and conversational partner.
Models of Language Switching
Paradis (1989) has offered an explanation of bilingual performance, both normal and aphasic, which denies the need for some mechanism to account for language switching. In his activation model of language processing (based in part on Green, 1986 ), Paradis posits the same cognitive form and neurological function for monolingual and bilingual speakers. In Paradis'
model there is no switch mechanism dedicated to shifting between language systems. All differences seen in bilingual aphasics' language production and code-switching in normal bilingual and IL speakers are accounted for with reference to "inhibition" of a particular language process or store.
The most significant aspect of this model is the determination that the ability to switch between languages (and ILs) is considered to be cognitively and neurolinguistically identical to monolinguals' ability to shift between the various speech registers required in different discourse domains. The VenetanItalian bilingual aphasic case described above would therefore be interpreted in Paradis' model as an example of an impairment in the ability to use the appropriate social language register in speech production. Certain right hemisphere damaged patients have paralinguistic, pragmatic problems in their use of language as well (Code, 1987) .
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In addition, it has been reported that certain right (but not left) hemisphere damaged patients have difficulty expressing, in their language and tone, emotions appropriate to context (Borodet al. 1984) . But patients of this type would not be classified as aphasic--i.e. their central linguistic system and linguistic competence is intact.
Significantly, Aglioti and Fabbro's patient discussed above has a lesion located in a subcortical area adjacent to the classical left cortical language zone.
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Note that one of the difficulties resulting from this lesion was the inability to switch appropriately between languages as context demanded. Monolingual patients with lesions in this area are not described as producing socially or pragmatically inappropriate language but are in fact aphasic (Damasio et al., 1982) .
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Evidence for the Production of Context-dependent Language.
There is neurolinguistic evidence, which will be discussed below, to suggest that people's ability to know what particular language they are listening to is situated outside the left hemisphere cortical language zone, and this ability is quite impervious to disruption from the kind of damage that leads to aphasia. There seems to be something very fundamental in auditory processing which enables people to discriminate whether they are hearing their own native language or another.
In aphasic patients with severe auditory comprehension disorders, the ability to discriminate their native language from another language is preserved (Boller and Green, 1972) . The ability to discern which language is being spoken is preserved in these patients even though there is little demonstrable indication that they can extract any meaning from listening to their NL.
There is also evidence that determining which language one is being addressed in and producing that language in return may be dissociated. A polyglot aphasic (Perecman, 1984) who demonstrated an inability to produce speech in a specified language, producing spontaneous translations and language mixing,
could always identify what language was being spoken to him even if he could not produce a response in that language. Indeed he would often spontaneously produce language identity tags to repetitions of utterances.
Other aspects of primary auditory-verbal processing appear to have a different neurolinguistic status. Discrimination of emotional affect in voices conveyed by suprasegmental changes in pitch appears to be affected along with the comprehension and production of other context-sensitive aspects of communication by right hemisphere disruption (Borod et al. 1985) .
The ability to identify a speaker and therefore know with whom you are speaking has also been investigated. colleagues (1985, 1987) report that both non-aphasic right and aphasic left hemisphere brain damaged patients do poorly on voice discrimination and speaker identification tasks.
While Van
Lancker's normal control subjects found the task of unknown voice discrimination an extremely easy one, a study by Lorch and Meara (1994) suggested that the task of unknown language discrimination is a relatively difficult one for monolingual subjects. Unknown language identification appears to be somewhat easier (Lorch and Meara, 1989a; 1989b) . The cognitive ability to apprehend aspects of the language context generally (and indeed which language you are hearing specifically) is still poorly understood.
Taken together, this evidence from normal and neurologically impaired subjects begins to build a picture of the complex organization of the multitude of auditory-verbal linguistic and cognitive processes implicated in listening to and producing Lgs and ILs. The notion of a unitary 'switch mechanism,' used to describe the speaker/hearer's variation in language performance in interlingual situations is not supported by the evidence under review. Neurolinguistic evidence also fails to support models of language processing which treat switching between languages and switching between different social registers of one language in the same fashion.
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The ability or inability to produce gentleman rather than bum does not appear to be neurolinguistically equivalent to the ability or inability to produce homme rather than man.
The conceptualization of this problem has crucial bearing on the larger issue of the nature of linguistic processes and their relation to other cognitive processes in IL systems which are sensitive to contextual information. The formulation of the modularity question for descriptions of the cognitive status of IL learning and use will ultimately need to be addressed.
Neurolinguistic evidence can contribute to the understanding of the organization of contextually-based language production. The considerations of cases of variation in bilingual aphasic language production and psycholinguistic evidence of extralinguistic functions in normal monolingual subjects as described above can contribute to considerations of speakers' capacity to produce variation in interlingual contexts. context (Selinker and Douglas, 1985) . If this general perspective proves empirically valid, how this range of IL genres is selected and switched between in the language production process requires a cognitive level of description. Only then will a comprehensive model of IL performance be obtained.
If both register switching and language switching can be described as being triggered by the perception of contextually based cues, then both will have direct implication for on-line linguistic processes--word choice, syntactic structure, phonological form, etc. What has to be explained is why then should the neurolinguistic evidence not reflect these parallels?
The currently considered models either 1) describe both language and register switching as internal to the language system (e.g., Paradis) or 2) language switching between languages is modulated by a 'switch mechanism' (e.g., Penfield). The aphasia evidence suggests that the neurolinguistic organization of the ability to draw on different language systems can be impaired centrally.
In order to produce contextually sensitive speech cognitive systems external to the central linguistic system are required.
The notional 'switch mechanism' must be developed and refined.
An explanatory account must include the complex interaction and integration of several distinct psycholinguistic processes--e.g., identifying which language is being spoken, accessing the appropriate lexicon and parser, and indeed knowing what language your listener knows and what the situation requires.
Acknowledgements. 2. Aglioti and Fabbro (1993 , p.1362 ) cite Pötzl (1930 as referring to an alteration in the switch mechanism being responsible for the permanent 'tuning' on one language only.
An early form of this
3. Though the authors do not use the concept of " interlanguage" it is clear from their report that the L2 behaviour described can be interpreted in this manner.
4. The work of Jakobson (1956) on 'similarity disorders ' and Goldstein (1948) on the impairment in the 'abstract attitude' reflected in some aphasic patients may be seen as possible precursors to this notion.
5.
The case of Christopher the "Polyglot Savant" who has extrodinary language learning abilities while demonstrating severe cognitive limitations in all other intellectual domains (Smith and Tsimpli, 1991; 1995) is also a germane demonstration of the dissociation between linguistic competence and extralinguistic functions. This developmentally disordered individual has attained remarkable linguistic performance in sixteen languages, which he flawlessly and rapidly translates into English, but can not respond appropriately to non-literal meta-representational language meanings, eg. cartoons and jokes.
6. The lesion is reported to be located in the left subcortical basal ganglia, an area dedicated to language motor programming.
7. The explanation given by Aglioti and Fabbro for their patient's difficulty is couched in terms of a distinction in implicit and explicit memory. They argue that access to implicit memory--i.e., one's NL is controlled by the basal ganglia while explicit memory--i.e., formally acquired L2, is not.
